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11. introduction
It is very well known that default is a real and important fact in the econ-
omy. One way to get protection against default is to require collateral, as
happens in the Collateralized Mortgages Obligations market (CMO). In the
literature, several models have been suggested in order to price claims which
are subject to default, i.e., the possibility that sellers of claims will not honor
their obligations. Among these models we have the ones that cover the pos-
sibility of default by demanding collateral. The rst work in this context was
carried out by Dubey, Geanakoplos and Zame (1995), who modeled collateral
as a bundle of durable goods. In their model they avoid adverse selection
problems since all the lenders know what to expect to receive in each state
of nature (the minimum between the value of the claim and the value of the
exogenously xed collateral) and utility penalties are absent.
Recently, Geanakoplos and Zame (2007) studied the impact of collat-
eral on commodity and asset prices, since in many situations collateral can
be scarce. Araujo, P ascoa and Torres-Mart nez (2002) prove that collateral
avoids Ponzi schemes. They prove the existence of equilibrium without using
either debt constraints or transversality conditions. Kubler and Schmedders
(2003) have shown that the use of collateral facilitates the computation of
equilibria.
In none of the above models was there an analysis of arbitrage impli-
cations. Araujo, Fajardo and P ascoa (2005) were the rst to present the
implications of absence of arbitrage in an endogenous collateral model where
2borrowers are obliged to constitute collateral at the same time they short
sales and utility penalties are absent. This collateral is modeled as a bundle
of goods, as in in Dubey, Geanakoplos and Zame (1995). In the exogenous
collateral context, we have the results of Fajardo (2005) and Orrillo (2005),
who use the arbitrage denition introduced by Araujo, Fajardo and P ascoa
(2005).
However, in many cases the pricing implications derived by the absence of
pure arbitrage strategies are not too relevant from a practical point of view,
because the spreads obtained for asset prices are too wide and give no useful
information. Hence, in order to have more realistic spreads we need to rene
our notion of arbitrage.
There is evidence that traders operate in the market using dierent ratios
or measures to obtain spreads and in the literature many models have been
proposed to deal with trades of this kind. In particular, we have the models
that use the statistical arbitrage concept, as suggested by Bondarenko (2003).
These arbitrageurs use strategies that produce positive returns on average in
each state of nature. An analogous concept is used in Amaro de Matos and
Lacerda (2006) to study the pricing of contingent claims under the presence
of liquidity constraints.
In this paper we use three dierent notions of statistical arbitrage, equiv-
alent under some conditions and very related to the one introduced by Bon-
darenko (2003). Then, we study the implications of the absence of statistical
3arbitrage opportunities. We obtain a spread in the context of exogenous
collateral requirements and we prove that our arbitrage concept is compati-
ble with the existence of the solution to the individual utility maximization
problem.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we present the model
and introduce our notation; in Section 3 we dene generalized statistical
arbitrage and state our main results; in Section 4 we address the existence
of equilibrium; in the last section we state our conclusions.
2. Model
We consider an exchange economy over two periods. In the second period, a
nite number of states s 2 S = f1;2;:::;Sg can occur. There are H agents,
J assets and L durable goods. In the rst period, there is a market where
physical commodities and assets are traded against each other. In the second
period asset returns are delivered.
Let j  0 be the number of units of asset j the consumer bought and
'j  0 be the number of units he sold. Every sale should be backed by a bun-
dle of goods (collateral). The collateral is the vector of goods that the lender
is allowed to hold and the borrower is obliged to hold, and which assures that
the lender will receive something if default occurs. Let Cj 2 I RL
+ denote the
collateral that backs up asset j. Hence, an asset j is dened by the promise
of goods Rj 2 I RL
+nf0g and the collateral backing it (Rj;Cj). In this model
the collateral is kept by the borrowers, who will have utility returns from the
use of the collateral, as in the case of the Collateralized Mortgage Obligation
4markets (CMO). We also suppose that agents are not allowed to use their
future endowments as collateral, since markets anonymity is required. More-
over, as we are allowing for all goods to be durable with dierent degrees of
depreciation (depending on the state of nature), we assume that durability
is not aected by the identity of the user, or by intensity of its use. In this
way market anonymity is maintained.
Now we formalize our notation:
 l 2 L = f1;:::;Lg set of commodities.
 s 2 S = f1;2;:::;Sg set of states in the second period. Each state s
can occur with probability s. We denote the vector (1;2;:::;S) by
.
 h 2 H = f1;:::;Hg set of agents.
 j 2 J = f1;2;:::;Jg set of assets.
 eh = (eh
0;(eh)s2S) 2 I RL
+  I RSL
+ , initial endowments of agent h, such
that eh
s 6= 0; 8s 2 S
S
f0g:
 Uh : I RL
+  I RSL
+ ! I R is the utility function of agent h.
 x = (x0;(xs)s2S) is the consumption plan, x0 is the rst period con-
sumption and (x1;x2;::;xS) is the vector of second period consumption,
denoted by x 0.
 p = (p0;(ps)s2S) 2 4L 1 4SL 1 denotes the commodity price system
and  2 4J 1 denotes the asset prices of the economy, where 4n 1
denotes the n - simplex in I Rn.
5 (Rj;Cj)j2J are real assets where Rj : S 7! I RL
+nf0g is the promise made
by the asset j and Cj 2 RL
+ is the collateral that backs it.
 Yj : S 7! I RL
++ are random variables that represent the durability of
goods
 Dh
j : S 7! I RL
+ is the true return on asset j in state s, i.e., Dh
j(s) is the
total amount of money to be delivered by agent h on asset j in state s.





The budget constraints of each agent are:
p0(x0   e
h
0) + (   ') + p0
X
j2J












Dj(s)'j  0; 8s 2 S;
(2)
where
Dj(s) = minfpsRj(s);psY (s)Cjg; 8s 2 S: (3)




h(x0 + C';x 0) (4)
where
B
h : 4L 1  4SL 1  4J 1  4J 1 7! I R
L(S+1)
+  I R
J





h(p;;C) := f(x;;') 2 I R
L(S+1)
+  I R
J
+  I R
J
+ : (1); (2) and (3) holdg;
which is a convex set.
Now, let us use the following matrix form:








where P  (x   e) = (p0(x0   e0);p1(x1   e1   Y1x0);::;pS(xS   eS   YSx0)),
	 = (;'),




6 6 6 6 6
6 6 6
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D(1) p1Y (1)C   D(1)
D(2) p2Y (2)C   D(2)
 
 
D(S) pSY (S)C   D(S)
3
7 7
7 7 7 7 7
7 7 7
5
Observe that  is the buy price vector and    p0C is the net sale price
vector.
3. Statistical Arbitrage
Let us start by dening statistical arbitrage opportunities in a nontriv-
ial context where p >> 0, because monotonicity of preferences assures that
7the commodity arbitrage opportunities derived from zero spot prices have to
be ruled out. It should be stressed that Statistical Arbitrage is not riskless,
whereas pure arbitrage is. However, it is widely used by traders in the market.
Let us denote by   x the expected value of the variable x with respect
to the historical probabilities .
Denition 1 We say that there exist strong statistical arbitrage opportuni-
ties (SSAO) if 9 	 2 I R2J
+ such that
	 < 0 and   A(C)	  0
The following denition follows in spirit Bondarenko (2003), i.e., a zero
cost strategy with positive expected return in the next period. Our denition
does not coincide with Bondarenko (2003), because Bondarenko's denition
considers that the expected payo as well as the conditional expected payo
in each nal state of the nature has to be nonnegative. In our two-period
economy, as there is one way to achieve each state of nature, the conditional
expected at each nal state equals the return at that state. Hence, if we
use Bondarenko's denition, requiring that the conditional expected return
has to be nonnegative at each state of nature, the denition of an arbitrage
opportunity would be obtained.
Denition 2 We say that there exist pure statistical arbitrage opportunities
(PSAO) if 9 	 2 I R2J
+ such that
	 = 0 and   A(C)	 > 0
Our last denition (3) is a more general denition of statistical arbitrage.
8Denition 3 We say that 	 2 I R2J
+ is a generalized statistical arbitrage
opportunity (GSAO) if it is either a SSAO or PSAO. i.e.
	  0 and   A(C)	  0
with at least one strict inequality.
The rst theorem of asset pricing with statistical arbitrage and default is
presented below:
Theorem 1 a) There is no SSAO if and only if there exists  2 I R
1+2J
+
such that the equalities in (5) are satised.
b) There is no GSAO if and only if there exists  2 I R
1+2J
++ such that the
equalities in (5) are satised.
S X
s=1






s0Dj(s) j+J; 8j 2 J:
(5)
Proof:













s(psY (s)C1   D1(s))
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s(psY (s)CJ   DJ(s))
#
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9where I is the J  J identity matrix and 0 is the J  J null matrix.
We can observe that for each C:
9y 2 I R
2J : ^ Ae
(C)y  0 , 9y 2 I R
2J : A
e
(C)y  0 and y  0:
Then, the absence a of SSAO is equivalent to = 9y 2 I R2J such that ^ Ae
(C)y 

















In an analogous way we obtain (b) using another version of Farkas' Lemma
(see Luenberger (1969), pag. 167).
Remark 1 Under the assumption that there exists j 2 J such that Cj 6=
01, the existence of a SSAO implies the existence of a PSAO. In order to
check this consider that 	 is a SSAO. Dene another strategy ^ 	 equal to
	 with the exception on the amount bought of asset j, which is such that
j^ j = jj   	. Then, if j = 0; ^ 	 will obviously be a PSAO, since
we can buy as much as we want of asset j and we know that Dj(s) > 0. If
j > 0, let ^ j = j   	=j. Then, ^ j > 0, ^ 	 = 0 and   A(C)^ 	 > 0.
We conclude that ^ 	 is a PSAO.
Remark 2 Under the assumption that Cj 6= 0;8j 2 J, the existence of a
non trivial PSAO2 implies the existence of a SSAO. To verify this, consider
1This guarantees Dj(s) > 0.
2By trivial PSAO we mean the strategies derived from j = 0 or (p0Cj   j) = 0.
10two possible scenarios concerning 	. Firstly, consider the case when 	 is a
PSAO with an j : j > 0. If this is the case, dene another strategy ^ 	
equal to 	 with the exception of the amount bought of asset j which is equal
to ^ j = j     A(C)	=
P
s sDj(s), with   1 and such that ^ j > 0.
Hence, as 	 is a non trivial PSAO, we have ^ 	 < 0 and   A(C)^ 	  0,
which allows to conclude that ^ 	 is a SSAO. Secondly, consider the case that
	 is a PSAO such that @j : j > 0. However, as 	 is a PSAO there must
exist ^ j : '
^ j > 0. By contradiction to what we intend to verify, suppose that 	
is an SSAO. By Theorem 1, we have p0C   2 I RJ
+ and, as 	 is a nontrivial
PSAO, we have p0Cj   j > 0;8j. Hence, from 	 = 0, we must have
	 = 0, obtaining a contradiction.
Remark 3 If C 2 I RJ
++ and  2 I R2J
++, then the three statistical arbitrage
notions are equivalents.
Now we present a kind of second part of the fundamental theorem of
asset pricing, in a default context with collateral, derived from absence of
generalized statistical arbitrage. To this end we assume that Cj 6= 0; 8j 2 J,
which from the economic point of view is a natural assumption.
Theorem 2 Under the assumption that utility functions are continuous and
strongly monotonic, (ii) implies (i):
i) The individual optimization problem described in (4) for the agent h 2
H has a solution.
ii) There are no generalized statistical arbitrage opportunities for the agent
h 2 H.
11Proof : We know that if there is no GSAO then there can not exist pure ar-
bitrage opportunities in the sense introduced by Araujo, Fajardo and P ascoa
(2005)3, since this demands positive returns in each state of nature. Then,
by Orrillo (2005), (i) follows. 
In order to establish the inverse implication, some restrictions on the
utility function are needed. Hence, we say that the utility function satises






spsys =) u( : ;x)  u( : ;y); 8x;y 2 I R
SL
+ :
Theorem 3 Under the assumptions that utility functions are continuous,
strongly monotonic and satisfy condition (C), (i) implies (ii).
Proof :













s   Y (s)x
h
0) = D(s)
h + [psY (s)C   D
h(s)]'
h; 8s 2 S: (6)
Additionally, let ~ 	 = (~ ; ~ ') be a GSAO. Then, two possibilities: (a)
~ 	 = 0 and  A(C)~ 	 > 0 or (b) ~ 	 < 0 and  A(C)~ 	  0. Due to Remark
1 is enough to consider (a).
Consider a new allocation (^ ; ^ ') := (h + ~ ;'h + ~ '), and consumption ^ x,
such that ^ x0 = xh
0 and ^ xs such that
ps(^ xs   e
h
s   Y (s)^ x0) = D(s)^  + [psY (s)C   D(s)]^ '; 8s 2 S: (7)
3Also used in Fajardo (2005) and Orrillo (2005)









s; 8s 2 S:
Applying condition (C) for future consumption and strict monotonicity for
present consumption we have an allocation that is feasible and that increases
utility. 
4. Equilibrium
In our economy an equilibrium is a price system (p;) and allocations (xh;h;'h)h2H



























As we have seen in theorem 2, if there is no GSAO then there exists a
solution for the individual optimization problem. Hence, we can state the
following result
Theorem 4 Under the usual assumptions of strictly positive endowments,
strictly positive depreciation rates, strictly positive collateral, return matrix
dierent from zero, and utility functions continuous, concave and strictly
increasing, the absence of GSAO implies the existence of equilibrium with
default and collateral.
Proof :
As we have not PSAO we can apply theorem 3 in Araujo, Fajardo and P ascoa
13(2005), because our exogenous collateral context is a particular case of their
endogenous model4 .
Basically, in the absence of arbitrage, we can obtain endogenous bounds
for short sales, Then, as pointed out by Radner (1972), the failure of existence
of equilibrium is due to discontinuities in the budget set, that can be avoided
by putting bounds on short sales.
More precisely, By Th. (1) we know that absence of GSAO implies eq.




p0Cj   j; 8j 2 J (8)
In other words short sales are bounded. .
The main idea behind the equilibrium result is that in the presence of
default and durable commodities used as collateral, the absence of statistical
arbitrage implies existence of equilibrium. We can resume our analysis as
follows:
@GSAO ) @PSAO ) Existence of Individual Optimality ) Existence of Equilibrium,
and, reciprocally,
Existence of Equilibrium ) Existence of Individual Optimality ) @PSAO ; @GSAO:
4See also theorem 2 in Orrillo (2006) or, alternatively, theorem 1 in Geanakoplos and
Zame (2007).
5See also Fajardo (2005) and Orrillo (2005).
145. Conclusions
This paper has addressed the implications of absence of generalized statisti-
cal arbitrage in a two period economy with incomplete markets and default
with exogenous collateral, obtaining in this way a spread for asset prices. It
is worth noting that, as in Ara ujo, Fajardo and P ascoa (2005), asset prices
are not martingales, resulting from the presence of market frictions. Also,
we obtain a type of fundamental theorem of asset pricing derived from the
absence of statistical arbitrage, proving the existence of state price deators
and guaranteeing the existence of optimality for an individual agent. Finally,
we have addressed the existence of equilibrium.
Interesting extensions of our model can be obtained by considering utility
penalties as in Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik (2005).
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